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Chapter 4
Towards a Linked Democracy Model
Abstract In this chapter we lay out the properties of participatory ecosystems as
linked democracy ecosystems. The goal is to provide a conceptual roadmap that
helps us to ground the theoretical foundations for a meso-level, institutional theory
of democracy. The identification of the basic properties of a linked democracy
eco-system draws from different empirical examples that, to some extent, exhibit
some of these properties. We then correlate these properties with Ostrom’s design
principles for the management of common-pool resources (as generalised to groups
cooperating and coordinating to achieve shared goals) to open up the question of
how linked democracy ecosystems can be governed.
Keywords Linked democracy  Common-Pool resources
4.1 Introduction
In previous chapters we have suggested that our model of linked democracy can be
represented as a three-layered, overlapping structure of Linked Open Data (LOD),
linked platforms, and linked ecosystems. A linked democracy model represents the
distributed interplay between people, digital technologies, and data (see Fig. 4.1).
We have also provided examples of digital platforms and ecosystems that exhibit a
certain degree of connectedness by tapping on LOD, on open data, or on crowd-
sourced data produced elsewhere.
Breaking silos down is a common, distinctive feature of the examples we have
reviewed. But are there any other properties than we can distill from these exam-
ples? Moreover, is it possible to turn those properties into design principles that
help to orchestrate a linked democracy model? Design principles should guide the
implementation of a linked democracy model; they should also capture the insti-
tutional arrangements needed to produce aligned decision making in a given
domain, either local or global. As we have seen with the Icelandic or Mexico City
examples, a lack of institutional endorsement of carefully designed participatory
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outcomes can bring crowdsourced constitutional processes to a deadlock. Linked
democracy is about finding ways out of locked democracy.
We are fully aware that generalizing specific design principles for the efficient
functioning of a linked democracy would require an exhaustive, large-scale survey
of case studies. We have examined some illustrative examples in the previous
chapters, but this falls short of providing a comprehensive panorama. Therefore, in
this chapter we will first identify some distinctive properties of a linked democracy
model based on our previous examples. Second, we will map these properties onto
the well-established set of design principles that Elinor Ostrom identified as
enabling effective management of ‘common-pool resources’ (CPR) groups (Ostrom
1990, 90–102). Recently, David Wilson et al. reviewed Ostrom’s principles from an
evolutionary perspective to argue that they ‘have a wider range of application than
CPR groups and are relevant to nearly any situation where people must cooperate
and coordinate to achieve shared goals’ (Wilson et al. 2013, 522). We consider
linked democracy ecosystems to be one of those situations involving cooperation—
in performing a wide range of tasks—and coordination—of large groups of indi-
viduals, so the principles can guide further empirical research in this area. An
additional advantage of looking at linked democracy models through these lenses is
that the notion of ‘politically relevant knowledge’ that we have been repeatedly
borrowing from Josiah Ober in previous chapters of this book (Ober 2008; 2015)
can be also seen as ‘knowledge commons’, that is, as a shared resource of ‘intel-
ligible ideas, information, and data in whatever form in which it is expressed or
obtained’ (Hess and Ostrom 2007, 7).
Ultimately, the linked democracy model that we propose is partially descriptive.
It builds on properties underlined from real examples in politics, law, and policy
making. Yet, none of the examples reviewed exhibit all the properties listed below.
Fig. 4.1 A linked democracy model
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Thus, we argue that our model has a prescriptive component, one that helps us to
establish some theoretical foundations for what we consider to be a fully opera-
tional linked democracy.
4.2 Properties of a Linked Democracy Model
The properties we propose here are distilled from the different participatory sce-
narios examined throughout the pages of this book. We highlight here the properties
that we consider most relevant for analysing participatory ecosystems from the
perspective of a linked democracy model. These properties can be described as
follows:
(i) Contextually-bound. Interactions between people, technologies, and data
always occur at specific settings. To borrow Simon’s classical concepts,
these interactions constitute the ‘inner environment’ (Simon 1969; 1988)
that can be ‘represented by a set of given alternatives of action’ (Simon
1988, 70). At the same time, people are identifiable as individuals or groups
coming together with a common purpose. Depending on the purpose, they
may be geographically concentrated or, rather, dispersed across the globe
(or both). Either way, people are connected online and the networks they
form are traceable; technologies include specific devices and tools (social
media platforms, deliberation platforms, participatory apps, distributed
protocols, sensors, etc.); data comprises particular datasets with different
formats (unstructured data, open data, linked open data, etc.) and licenses of
use.
(ii) Open ended. Even if contextually bound, participatory ecosystems are also
highly dynamic: the interactions between people, technologies, and data
evolve and adapt as the context changes, as if in a perpetual beta state.
Interests and objectives of individuals, groups, and institutions are not
necessarily stable either. A myriad of digital tools are continuously tested;
some are adopted widely, some others become niche, and some others are
quickly abandoned. As regards data, it is now commonplace to characterise
data flows with the 4Vs (volume, velocity, variety, and veracity). The
interactions between these three different dimensions are complex, in the
sense that the behavior of the ecosystem as a whole cannot be predicted by
the behavior of the individual components. If any, a theory of linked
democracy is a theory of complex adaptive systems (Holland and Miller
1991).
(iii) Blended. Interactions between people take place seamlessly, both offline
and online. Global initiatives, or local initiatives that become transnational,
may set local chapters where people can meet offline, organise, and discuss
(e.g. the European movement DIEM25 or #blacklivesmatter). For Bennet
and Segerberg, this hybrid component is a distinctive trait of new models of
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‘digitally networked action’ that leverage digital media as organizing agents
(Bennet and Segerberg 2012; 2013). And this is true not just for political
initiatives. Massive open online courses (MOOCs) attracting thousands of
students across the world typically invite enrolled members to form local
groups, organise meetups in physical places and engage in collective
learning (Goldberg 2015).
(iv) Distributed. Participatory ecosystems can be represented as distributed
communication networks with multiple nodes (Baran 1964). The distinction
between ‘decentralised’ and ‘distributed’ models is not always clear. While
the two concepts are often used synonymously, distributed models can also
be considered as a subset of decentralised systems (e.g. Eagar 2017).
Ultimately, the use of one term or another depends on the choice of a
combination of technical specifications—architectural and logical features—
and governance models—decision-making processes, regulations, and
politics. In our perspective, in distributed participatory ecosystems indi-
viduals, groups, and communities can be identified as horizontal nodes,
although it is also possible to portray communities as clusters of edges or
links. As de Reus et al. have noted, ‘link communities have been reported
for several empirical networks, including metabolic networks, mobile phone
networks and social networks, and have been shown to highlight different
subsystems than node-based communities’ (de Reus et al. 2014). Such an
‘edge-centric perspective’ allows for the identification of both ‘community
hot spots’ and redundancies: links from different communities may con-
verge at a single node and a node may belong to more than one single
community (idem). This is the perspective currently adopted to map the
human ‘connectome’, a concept first coined by Olaf Sporns and colleagues
to refer to ‘the comprehensive structural description of the network of
elements and connections forming the human brain.’ (Sporns et al. 2005). If
we extend the analogy to our participatory ecosystems, we can suggest that
different participatory ecosystems will exhibit different connectivity maps—
or participatory ‘connectomes’. Likewise, we will need to develop and
refine an appropriate ‘connectomics’ (Seung 2013) to map and analyse their
structuctural connections.
(v) Technologically agnostic. Participatory ecosystems rely on tools and tech-
nologies that can be replaced at any time. Technologies can fail, become
banned, or its supply be interrupted. Nevertheless, it is possible to use,
adapt, or develop alternatives in the light of the new conditions. Much as
successive bans on Napster and other services did not deter Internet users
from sharing files in peer to peer networks, political and civic actors typi-
cally find alternative ways to connect and engage in new spaces. The
Catalan referendum for independence of 1st October, 2017 offers another
interesting example of activists’ use of distributed, encrypted technologies
to circumvent censorship of pro-referendum websites and to avoid eaves-
dropping of communications (Poblet 2018).
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(vi) Modular. Participation and civic engagement are fluid concepts that take
multiple forms. Digital tools now support a vast range of options for citizens
and groups: data collection, fact checking, monitoring, signing petitions,
crowdfunding, ideating, deliberating, drafting, voting, etc. (see Table 3.1
for a taxonomy of these tools). In a modular participatory ecosystem, these
options are available to cater for different levels of interest and engagement.
Some forms of engagement will likely attract large numbers of participants,
while some others, requiring more time, cognitive effort, or dedication, will
appeal to smaller crowds. Participation is therefore the combined outcome
of modular engagement. The crowdsourcing of the constitution in Mexico
City offers an example of designed modular engagement by combining
different participatory tools (e.g. a survey tool, a crowdsourcing platform,
Change.org, and social media) that target heterogeneous forms of engage-
ment. Likewise, the vTaiwan initiative adopts a modular approach in its
four-stage procedure of open consultation, with flexible use of digital tools
along the process (Hsiao et al. 2018).
(vii) Scalable. Participatory ecosystems should be able to accommodate
increasing numbers of nodes (participants, technologies, data) and interac-
tions between them without compromising connectivity and effectiveness.
While scalability has many definitions and attributes, from a linked
democracy perspective scalability implies an organizational dimension
(adding more nodes to the pool of resources); a functional dimension
(adding more functionalities); and a geographical dimension (adding more
geographical and digital areas and communities).
(viii) Knowledge-reusing. Participatory ecosystems tap into collective intelli-
gence to produce new forms of collective, commons-based knowledge. This
knowledge may adopt multiple formats: unstructured conversation threads
in forums, websites, social media, portals; annotated documents and
wiki-documents, crowdsourced legislation and policy drafts, proposals,
manifestos, etc.; infographics, reports, case-study repositories, podcasts,
videos, etc. Both deliberation and epistemic approaches to democracy
assume the need to find and reuse knowledge in deliberation and
decision-making processes. Josiah Ober adds to this necessity the dimen-
sion of problem solving, in the sense that untapped knowledge can only be
‘discovered’ in relation to a particular political issue by making a connec-
tion of relevance between that knowledge and the issue at hand (Ober 2008;
2015). From a linked democracy approach, we are interested in the potential
application of principles and protocols of linked open data to make these
connections relevant and possible.
(ix) Knowledge-archiving. To reuse politically relevant knowledge, participa-
tory ecosystems need to find ways to trace and reproduce such knowledge.
Traceability, reproducibility, and accountability are essential components of
collective, commons-based knowledge. This is not different from scientific
knowledge. In the last few years, archivists and scientists have renewed
their concerns about the importance of keeping provenance and granting
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reproducibility of research data and research objects in general (not just
data, but research protocols, pre-prints, articles, code, software, etc.) (e.g.
Corcho et al. 2012). Provenance and reproducibility of scientific knowledge
is now supported by the semantic web technologies and standards described
in Chap. 1. Taking stock of advances in this area, the idea is that every
valuable knowledge product of a participatory ecosystem should be stored
along with provenance information, that is, complete metadata information
on the authorship, creation date, etc. If a ‘research object’ now contains
everything necessary to reproduce in silicon a scientific experiment, the
‘political knowledge object’ to be preserved should contain everything
necessary to ground every political decision to be made (data about when a
decision was made, argumentations, votations, documents produced, etc.).
To date, there are only a few examples of knowledge-archiving systems in
the space we are considering. Among them, the Manifesto Project, which
provides policy positions from over 1000 political parties in 50 countries
since 1945;1 the database Parties and Elections in Europe,2 which collects
data about legislative elections in Europe since 1945; the Constitute Project,
a database of nearly 200 constitutions across the world;3 or Parlgov.org4 (a
database for parties, elections and cabinets for EU and OECD countries).
Nevertheless, these initiatives, while providing highly valuable data points,
still fall short of elaborating the ‘political knowledge object’ we are sug-
gesting to be traced, reproduced, reused, and accounted for.
(x) Aligned. Participatory ecosystems may emerge bottom-up, as civic
engagement initiatives, or top-down, from legislative or open government
initiatives. In any case, only if institutional arrangements are in place there
will be the consequential decision making and feedback loops that charac-
terise aligned processes. The only example we found of bottom-up initiated,
aligned participatory ecosystem is vTaiwan, stemming from the initiative of
the Taiwanese civic-tech community (Hsiao et al. 2018). At the other end,
there are two cases of top-down generated participatory ecosystems
exhibiting alignment: the Irish Citizen’s Assembly, whose recommendation
of the topic of marriage equality led to a national referendum, and the case of
Utrecht’s citizens panels, where members are remunerated and the local
council commits to incorporate the panels’ advice on the policy (Meijer et al.
2017). Perhaps if we had considered cases of participatory budgeting—an
institutional innovation from the late 1980s—the results would have been
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Sónia Gonçalves has identified a trend where Brazilian ‘municipalities using
participatory budgeting favored an allocation of public expenditures that
closely matched popular preferences’ (Gonçalves 2014). For Gianpaolo
Baiocchi, instead, the relationship between different forms of participatory
budgeting and the administration is rather ambiguous: ‘If citizens cannot
debate and change the rules, if there is no plural inclusion of citizenry, or if
decision-making procedures are not transparent, then participatory budget-
ing may conceal a new form of domination that has nothing to do with a new
process of democratization’ (Baiocchi 2015, 10).
In Fig. 4.2 below we represent the properties of a linked democracy ecosystem
with a graphic model that clusters them in several dimensions.
The linked democracy ecosystem is framed by its specific context, but its
boundaries (dotted frame) are open ended and porous, as both the inner and the
outer environment evolve dynamically [contextually-bound/open ended]. At the
bottom, there is a layer of blended, distributed interactions between people, tech-
nologies, and data. On top of this layer, agnostic, scalable and modular technologies
can be incorporated from the outer context. By leveraging these technologies,
blended and distributed networks produce collective, commons-based knowledge
that can be reused and archived with ongoing updates. When decisions are made
based on this knowledge, the outcomes are consequential and extend their reach to
the outer context, aligning with and informing external processes of decision
making.
Fig. 4.2 A relational model
of properties of a linked
democracy ecosystem
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4.3 Linked Democracy Ecosystems and Ostrom’s Core
Design Principles
The properties highlighted above are just conceptual artifacts to capture crucial
developments in current participatory ecosystems. These properties do not translate
into design principles or institutional rules: we have focused on participatory
ecosystems capable of producing collective, politically relevant knowledge, not on
how these systems are managed or could be managed. Yet, if we consider linked
democracy ecosystems as entities capable of self-managing different forms of
commons-based knowledge, we can then check how their properties relate with
Ostrom’s design principles for the effective management of common pool resource
institutions or systems (CPRs). Ostrom’s eight design principles have triggered a
vast amount of research since they were formulated in 1990. In a nutshell, these
principles are (Ostrom 1990, 90):
– Clearly defined boundaries





– Minimal recognition of rights to organize
– For large social systems, nested enterprises (appropriation, provision, enforce-
ment, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple
layers of nested enterprises).
In revisiting this work two decades later, Michael Cox and colleagues contended
that ‘although there has been substantial support for the principles, some scholars
have criticized their theoretical grounding or argued that they are overly precise
with respect to the range of conditions to which they might be applied’ (Cox et al.
2010: 251). Following their review, Cox et al. proposed a modified version of the
principles by splitting three of them in their basic components: in principle 1 they
distinguish between ‘user boundaries’ and ‘resource boundaries’; principle 2 is also
divided into two basic conditions—‘congruence between rules and local conditions’
and ‘congruence between appropriation and provision rules’ and in principle 4 a
similar distinction is made between ‘monitoring users’ and ‘monitoring the
resource’) (idem, 274). A further revision of the principles, as we mentioned earlier,
was done by Wilson, Ostrom and Cox, who used an evolutionary framework to
extend them beyond CPRs, thus covering many of the situations that involve
cooperation and coordination (Wilson et al. 2013, 522).
Both the principles and the analytical framework connected to them are
appropriate in the domain we are exploring in this book. In Hess and Ostrom’s
words:
This framework seems well suited for analysis of resources where new tech-
nologies are developing at an extremely rapid pace. New information technologies
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have redefined knowledge communities; have juggled the traditional world of
information users and information providers; have made obsolete many of the
existing norms, rules, and laws; and have led to unpredicted outcomes. Institutional
change is occurring at every level of the knowledge commons. (Hess and Ostrom
2007, 43).
Figure 4.3 puts the linked democracy (LD) properties next to CPR principles
(Ostrom 1990; Cox et al. 2010). Even if they operate at different dimensions (LD
properties are features drawn from participatory ecosystems, while CPR design
principles are governance principles) there are some relevant connections to
underline.
First, LD (i) and (ii) [contextually-bound and open-ended systems] are con-
nected with CPR-P1: they imply boundaries, even if more fluid and porous than the
‘clearly defined’ ones that Ostrom initially posited. Yet, our LD (i) and (ii) are still
congruent with the requirement of a group being able to ‘determine its own
membership’ (Ostrom 2010, 223). Other studies have noted that boundaries are
fuzzier rather than rigid in some CPRs (Cox et al. 2010). Ultimately, as Wilson
et al. put it, in absence of seemingly clearly defined boundaries, ‘the important
criterion is for the identity of the group and the parameters of the shared endeavor to
be clearly delineated within each context” (Wilson et al. 2013, 525).
Second, LD (iii) and (iv) [blended and distributed systems] align with all CRP
principles as later work from Ostrom and Hess (2007) includes the online dimen-
sion. Moreover, CPR principles (and CPR8 in particular) apply to groups whose
governance mechanisms are decentralized, even if the specific implementation may
differ from group to group (e.g. polycentric governance, subsidiarity, etc.) (Wilson
et al. 2013).
Third, technology-agnostic, scalable and modular properties (LD (v), (vi) and
(vii)) are connected to CPR-P2 to P8 as enablers of large-scale coordination and
cooperation activities in relation to those principles. In blended ecosystems, issues
Fig. 4.3 Connections between LD Properties and CPR Principles
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of large scale coordination and cooperation become even more complex: for
example, how to coordinate a participatory online process to introduce new legis-
lation involving tens or hundreds of thousands of participants?
Fourth, LD (viii) and (ix) properties [knowledge reusing and archiving] can be
applied to adjust and fine-tune any of the CPR-Ps to the particular participatory
ecosystem. As Wilson et al. note, ‘there is a striking correspondence between the
principles derived by Ostrom for CPR groups and the conditions that caused us to
evolve into such a cooperative species in the first place’ (Wilson et al. 2013, 526).
Among those conditions, ‘our capacity to transmit learned information across
generations’ (idem, 525). As we have seen in Chap. 1, reusing and archiving are
among the core purposes of the Web of Data. For a linked democracy ecosystem,
reusing and archiving properties augment our capacity to share and retrieve polit-
ically relevant knowledge across and from other ecosystems.
Finally, LD (x) is connected with CPRs P7 and P8. For linked democracy
ecosystems to be aligned, it is critical to have internal rules acknowledged and
respected in the outer environments (CPR-P7). Likewise, nesting local decision
making into multiple layers of governance may help to render those decisions more
efficient (CPR-P8). Mansbridge (2014) has shown that these two principles may
lead to different interpretations of how Ostrom perceives the role of the state. Thus,
Ostrom’s alleged ‘anti-state’ views could be inferred from her wording of CPR-7
[“The rights of appropriators to design their own institutions are not challenged by
external government authorities” (1990, 101), cited in Mansbridge 2014, 8]. Yet,
Mansbridge also concludes that Ostrom sees the role of the state in many occasions
as ‘proactive’ and she further examines the different functions it accomplishes in
managing CPRs (namely, threatening to impose solutions, providing relatively
neutral information, offering an arena for negotiation, and helping with monitoring
compliance) (Mansbridge 2014).
Our reading of these two principles, to be sure, is neither ‘anti-state’ nor
‘pro-state’. We rather read them with the lens of a linked democracy ecosystem and
the collective knowledge it produces. If that knowledge is ignored or distorted,
alignment with other layers of governance will not be achieved and the epistemic
benefits of democratic participation and engagement will be lost.
4.4 Conclusion
Our goal in this chapter is to provide a conceptual roadmap that helps us to ground
the theoretical foundations for a meso-level, institutional theory of democracy. We
have mapped the basic properties of a linked democracy ecosystem drawing from
different examples that, to some extent, exhibit some of these properties. We then
correlate these properties with Ostrom’s design principles for the management of
common-pool resources (as generalised to groups cooperating and coordinating to
achieve shared goals). As Wilson et al. have argued, ‘[Ostrom] design principles
cannot be implemented in a cookie cutter fashion but require a local adaptation to
84 4 Towards a Linked Democracy Model
find the best implementations’ (Wilson et al. 2013, 527). This approach helps us to
raise our next set of questions: how can linked ecosystems be governed? What role
does law play? Is a new rule of law emerging from the interplay between people,
technology, and data? If so, how does it look like? We try to address these questions
in the next chapter.
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